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ABSTRACT 
Erin Cooley: More People But Less Mind: How Number Affects Mind Perception and Decisions 
to Harm 
(Under the direction of B. Keith Payne) 
 
Most moral codes agree that harming another person is wrong. However, instances in 
which people cause widespread harm abound. One reason for this discrepancy between moral 
values and behavior may be that people have difficulty imagining groups of people experiencing 
suffering. In this research, I first propose that people sometimes harm groups more readily than 
individuals. Second I propose that greater harm for groups (versus individuals) may be driven by 
the perception that groups are less capable of mentally experiencing sensations such as pleasure 
and pain. In a Preliminary Study I tested whether people are more likely to harm many than one 
when the targets are outgroup members. Contrary to hypotheses, participants were more likely to 
harm one than many regardless of group membership. Next, in Study 1, I examined whether 
people perceive mind differently in groups of people as compared to individuals from those 
groups. As predicted, across 19 categories, groups were perceived as having less mental capacity 
for experience than individuals. Study 2 extended these findings to examine whether reduced 
perceptions of experience among groups is driven by cues to being a group and to evaluate 
implications for decisions to harm. Results revealed that participants attributed less experience to 
a group described as a single entity as compared to a group described as a collection of 
individuals, or an individual. Interestingly, however, participants were most likely to harm the 
group described as a collection of individuals, and perceptions of experience did not mediate 
decisions to harm. Results suggest that people sometimes are more likely to harm many than one, 
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and that groups are attributed less of a capacity to experience than individuals. Future research 
should explore the mechanisms behind these seemingly independent effects. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2011 Occupy Wall Street protesters spread from the confines of Wall Street to stage a 
country-wide protest against wealth inequality in America. A unifying theme behind the 
movement was that the greed and corruption of the wealthiest 1% led the majority of the wealth 
to remain in the hands of a few. Building from this rhetoric, reports concurrently began to 
surface that Wall Street workers (often considered to be among the wealthy 1%) scored higher 
on measures of psychopathy than the general population (Decovny, 2012; Silver, 2012). Despite 
ultimately being discredited (Grohol, 2012), this link between Wall Street and psychopathy was 
intuitively appealing. How else does one explain the behaviors of people such as Bernie Madoff 
or the executives behind the Enron scandal who caused widespread financial harm to many 
people with a seeming lack of remorse?  
 Like the financial harm visible at the national level, physical harm, too, is sometimes 
directed toward many people at once—especially in the context of global conflict. For example, 
when deciding to launch a military attack, leaders are making a decision that will physically 
harm groups of people rather than individuals. Thus, sources of conflict, both within our country 
and internationally, highlight the importance of understanding how people conceive of harming 
many people at once.  
 In the present research, I propose that harm directed toward groups of people, in most 
cases, is not driven by psychopathy, but rather by the basic workings of a healthy mind. I reason 
that while people may find it easy to think of an individual experiencing pain and suffering, 
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imagining the suffering of a group of people may be more difficult to do. An interesting 
implication of perceiving the mind of a group as less capable of experiencing pain and suffering 
is that harming a group may ironically feel more moral than harming an individual--despite the 
fact that more harm is objectively being caused. To test these ideas, I will first examine 
experimentally what seems to be the case from observation—that people are sometimes more 
likely to harm many than one. Next I will examine whether groups are attributed less capacity to 
experience sensations such as pleasure and pain, and whether this differential mind perception of 
groups leads to a greater likelihood of harming groups. Such a hypothesis is consistent with 
existing research on factors which influence moral decisions to help, described next. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Moral Decision-Making and Number 
 Although no existing research has manipulated the number of potential victims in 
decisions to harm, research has examined the effect of number on another dimension of moral 
decision making: the choice to engage in helping behaviors. In deciding to help, number has a 
surprising effect. The more people who are suffering, the less people feel compassion or 
sympathy for their plight. This reduction in compassion as the number of victims rises has been 
called the “collapse of compassion” (Slovic, 2007). Because compassion helps motivate people 
to help (Batson et al. 1991), this collapse of compassion means that many suffering victims are 
ironically less likely to receive help than a single suffering individual (Slovic, 2007; Small, 
Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). This is why hearing about a single American soldier who was 
killed by a roadside bomb abroad can instill more compassion and distress than hearing statistics 
summarizing the thousands of Americans who died in the war in Iraq. Because the idea that 
people feel less compassion for many than for one is not intuitively obvious, much research has 
explored mechanisms that may explain this finding. 
 Some research has proposed that groups elicit less moral emotions than individuals 
because groups are more abstract (Schelling, 1968). Evidence for the role of abstraction in 
decisions to help comes from research on the identifiable victim effect. Holding the number of 
victims constant, people show more compassion toward a suffering identified individual (e.g., 
identified by name and photo) as compared to a suffering unidentified individual (Small & 
Lowenstein, 2003). If lack of identification inhibits emotional responses, then groups may 
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receive less compassion, not because of the number of victims, but because group members are 
not individually identified. More recent research, however, conflicts with this interpretation. 
Kogut and Ritov (2005) gave some participants information about multiple identified victims and 
others information about a single identified victim. Next they examined emotional responses and 
decisions to help. Interestingly, even when people received the same identifying information 
about groups as they had about an individual, insensitivity to mass suffering remained. Not only 
did participants show decreased compassion for an identified group as compared to an identified 
individual (Kogut & Ritov, 2005), but they also reported less blame for perpetrators who had 
harmed many identified victims as compared to one identified victim (Nordgren & McDonnell, 
2011). Although these findings do not rule out the possibility that even identified groups are 
more abstract than identified individuals, it does indicate that the collapse of compassion is not 
fully accounted for by a lack of identification of groups. More recent research argues that 
reduced compassion for groups is not driven by the way that groups are mentally represented, but 
rather by the motivations of the perceiver. 
 Supporting a motivated account, Cameron and Payne (2011) compared reactions to a 
suffering identified individual and a suffering identified group and found that the collapse of 
compassion was contingent on the expectation of a request for help. In this research, participants 
only showed the collapse of compassion toward many suffering victims when they had the 
expectation that they would later be asked to donate. Those who did not expect to be asked for a 
financial commitment actually reported feeling more for many victims than for one. Further 
evidence for a motivated account came from the finding that the collapse of compassion was 
greatest among those who were most skilled at regulating their emotions.  
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If groups of suffering victims elicit less help than a suffering individual then groups may 
also elicit more harm than an individual. However, the differences between helping and harming 
are also important to consider. Most people actively work to avoid harming others (do-no-harm 
principle; Baron, 1995; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Hauser, Tonnaer, & Cima, 2009). In fact, harm is 
so undesirable that people struggle to harm one person even when that harm will result in saving 
many (Foot, 1967; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Petrinovich, O'Neill, 
& Jorgensen, 1993; Mikhail, 2002). Harm aversion even extends to fake harm (Cushman, Gray, 
Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012). In two studies, Cushman and colleagues (2012) found that 
participants exhibited higher levels of physiological stress both when imagining and enacting 
fake harm to another individual (e.g., slicing someone’s throat with a fake knife) as compared to 
witnessing the same harmful actions done by others. Given this strong aversion to actively 
causing harm to an individual, why is it that harm still occurs? Research suggests that one of the 
central ways that people enact harm while maintaining their sense of moral integrity is through 
denying the experience of suffering to a potential victim. In essence, they deny the victim a 
human mind.  
Dehumanization Enables Harm 
 In his exploration of the abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, Zimbardo found a common theme 
among the American prison guards’ descriptions of why they abused the Iraqi prisoners. Prison 
guards emphasized that the lack of a shared language made it particularly easy to view the Iraqi 
prisoners as less than human, and that this enabled them to do things they never thought they 
could to another human being (Zimbardo, 2007). Similar research conducted within the criminal 
justice system finds that executioners, as compared to other prison staff, report the greatest levels 
of dehumanization of those killed—perhaps as a moral justification of the harm they directly 
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cause (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005).  Together this research suggests that 
dehumanization may enable moral disengagement such that causing harm no longer feels 
blameworthy (Bandura, 1999; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Harris & Fiske, 
2011). A more nuanced form of dehumanization is infrahumanization. Infrahumanization denies 
others uniquely human emotions such as guilt and shame but not emotions that are shared with 
animals such as anger and fear (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; 
Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000; Leyens, 
Rodriguez‐Perez, Rodriguez‐Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, & Demoulin, 2001; Haslam 2006). 
In effect, targets are denied a uniquely human essence making them indistinguishable from non-
human species (Leyens et al., 2001). Importantly even this subtle dehumanization has big 
consequences. In one study, outgroups who were manipulated to be the most infrahumanized 
were discriminated against the most (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). Similarly, recent research 
has linked ethnoreligious and political conflict to reduced perceptions of outgroups’ ability to 
experience love (a secondary emotion) as compared to hate (a primary emotion; Waytz, Young, 
& Ginges, 2014). 
 In the existing research on both dehumanization and infrahumanization, outgroups are 
often represented by individual exemplars. For example, to assess dehumanization of homeless 
people, researchers have used images of individual homeless people (Harris & Fiske, 2006; 
Harris & Fiske, 2011). However, people are frequently encountered around others. Thus, it is 
important for research to parse apart the effect of viewing a single individual as compared to a 
group on dehumanization and mind perception more generally. This is especially important 
given the link between mind perception and decisions to harm. To better understand how mind 
perception of groups may underlie decisions to harm groups of people, I will draw from the 
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framework of Gray and colleagues’ (2012) theory of dyadic morality. Within this theory, the 
authors argue that mind perception underlies all moral judgments—including, decisions to harm 
(Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011). 
Mind Attributions and Group Harm 
In their theoretical account of morality, Gray and colleagues (2012) argue that the 
perception of two interacting minds forms a stable template which underlies all moral judgments. 
This dyadic interaction of minds consists of both a moral agent who enacts help or harm and a 
moral patient who is the recipient of these behaviors. Importantly, these interacting minds are not 
one-dimensional. In a large internet survey of over 2000 people, mind perception was 
characterized by two distinct dimensions: experience and agency (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). 
Furthermore, central to the topic of the current proposal, this survey found that mind perception 
in terms of experience was more strongly correlated with desires to avoid harm than mind 
perception in terms of agency.  
Although not explicitly discussed within their dyadic template of morality, groups, much 
like individuals, can be attributed minds (Bloom & Veres, 1999; Kashima et al., 2005; Waytz & 
Young, 2012; Knobe & Prinz, 2008).  In fact, recent research indicates that groups not only can 
have minds, but that the mind attributed to a group can be completely independent of the mind 
attributed to individual members of that group (Jenkins, Dodell-Feder, Saxe, & Knobe 2014). In 
one study, Jenkins and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that under some circumstances, people 
will attribute mental states, which they operationalized as beliefs and preferences, to the group as 
a whole that they do not attribute to any of its members (and vice versa). As an example, imagine 
a group is choosing music for a fundraising event and that half of this group prefers classical 
music while the other half prefers heavy metal. As a compromise, the group chooses jazz for the 
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event. In this scenario, observers would likely say that the group as a whole prefers jazz but 
would not attribute this preference to any individual member of the group.  
Other research has compared group mind to individual mind, but by operationalizing 
mind in terms of a capacity for agency rather than beliefs and preferences. In particular, Watyz 
and Young (2012) found that groups are attributed less agency than individual members of that 
group; however they also found evidence for a trade-off such that the more that the group as a 
whole was attributed a mind in terms of agency, the less agency that was attributed to individuals 
within that group. Furthermore, these authors found that groups who were most group-like or 
entitative (e.g., high in proximity, similarity and common fate; Campbell, 1958) were more 
likely to be attributed a unified group mind than less entitative groups. Together these findings, 
along with those of Jenkins and colleagues (2014), converge on the idea that groups can be 
attributed minds of their own. The present research will extend these findings to examine how 
perceptions of mind in terms of experience vary in response to groups as compared to individuals 
from those groups. I expect that groups, and especially entitative groups, will be perceived as 
having less of a capacity for mind in terms of experience than individuals from those groups. 
Furthermore, I expect this reduced perception of experience within groups to have potential 
implications for decisions to harm groups. 
This hypothesis builds from existing research which has examined perceptions of 
experience for corporate groups. In particular, Knobe and Prinz (2008)  found that sentences 
describing a corporate group as having experience (e.g., “Acme Corp. is experiencing great joy”) 
were rated as sounding much more strange than those describing the same corporate group as 
having agency (e.g., “Acme Corp. intends to release a new product this January”). Although 
consistent with the present hypotheses, this work has been criticized for the potential influence of 
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experimenter bias (Strickland & Suben, 2012; Phelan, Arico, & Nichols, 2012). In particular, the 
researchers who generated the sentences that were then rated on “strangeness” by participants 
were not blind to hypotheses. Furthermore, as others have pointed out, results may have been 
driven by participants’ stereotypes of companies as being agentic rather than biased perceptions 
of mental capacities of groups in general (Rai & Diermeier, 2015).  
Addressing some of the concerns with the work of Knobe and Prinz (2008), Rai and 
Diermeier (2015) recently compared mind perception of companies with individual 
entrepreneurs in terms of both experience and agency. This research also manipulated whether 
the target was a victim of a moral transgression or a perpetrator of a moral transgression. When 
couched as victims, companies were attributed less experience than individual entrepreneurs; 
when couched as villains, companies and individual entrepreneurs were attributed similar levels 
of agency. However, because experience was only measured among participants assigned to the 
victim condition (but not the perpetrator condition), this research does not test how experience is 
attributed to groups as compared to individuals from those groups in a neutral context. 
Additionally, this existing research does not control for stereotypes of companies. Although 
stereotypes of companies and entrepreneurs are likely similar, it is still possible that companies 
were stereotyped as higher in competence and lower in warmth than entrepreneurs and that this 
drove perceived differences in perceptions of mental capacities for experience. Such a possibility 
is consistent with some of my previous research that demonstrates that groups elicit stereotypes 
more strongly than individuals from those groups (Cooley, Payne, & Insko, under review). To 
address this possibility, in the present research, I will directly measure stereotypes of companies 
as well as stereotypes of company members. By doing so, I will be able to statistically control for 
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stereotypes in analyses examining mind perception in order to establish the unique effects of 
being a group on mind perception beyond the influence of stereotypes.  
 In summary, existing research and theory suggest that groups can be perceived as having 
a mind. The present research will build from this existing research to examine whether group 
mind is systematically different than individual mind. In particular, I will measure mind 
attributions of experience and agency to groups as compared individuals from those groups. I 
predict that groups and especially entitative groups will be perceived as having less mental 
capacity for experience as compared to individuals. Given that attributions of experience are 
related to decisions to harm (Gray et al., 2007), if groups are not attributed mind in terms of 
experience to the same degree as individuals, then groups may be more vulnerable to harm than 
individuals. For this to be the case, attributions of group mind should conflict with the ability to 
perceive individual suffering. 
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CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
 Across three studies I will examine differences in mind perception of groups as compared 
to individuals as well as its consequences for decisions to harm groups of people. First, in a 
Preliminary Study, I aimed to experimentally establish that groups are sometimes more likely to 
be harmed than individuals. To do this, I tested whether people are more likely to harm groups of 
outgroup members as compared to individual outgroup members in the context of global warfare. 
Results did not support hypotheses. Instead results revealed two main effects such that people 
were less likely to harm ingroup members than outgroup members and less likely to harm many 
than one. Because these results ran counter to my hypothesis that outgroup groups would be 
harmed more than outgroup individuals, I next focused on my second hypothesis that groups 
may be attributed less of an ability to experience sensations such as pleasure and pain than 
individuals. In particular, in Study 1, I examined how people attribute mind to groups of people 
as compared to individuals from those groups.  Supporting hypotheses, across 19 categories, 
groups were attributed less mental capacity for experience than individuals from those groups. 
Consistent with prior work (Waytz & Young, 2012), groups were also attributed less agency than 
individuals. Finally, Study 2 tested whether an entitative group was attributed less mind than a 
group described as a collection of individuals (i.e., low entitativity). Study 2 also examined 
decisions to harm. Although groups were, indeed, attributed less capacity for experience than 
was a collection of individuals or an individual, participants were more likely to harm the less 
entitative group than the entitative group or a single individual. Together these results indicate 
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that groups are attributed low levels of experience and that, sometimes, people more readily 
harm many than one. However, contrary to expectations, variations in mind perception did not 
account for decisions to harm. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRELIMINARY STUDY 
 
 In a Preliminary Study that motivated this dissertation project, I tested whether groups, 
and especially groups of outgroup members, were more likely to be harmed than individuals in 
the context of global warfare. In particular, participants reported their endorsement of launching 
a drone that would injure innocent groups or individuals that belong to an ingroup (i.e., 
Americans) or an outgroup (i.e., Afghans). I predicted that there would be a main effect of group 
membership such that people would be more likely to endorse harm toward the outgroup. This 
idea is supported by decades of research on love for the ingroup and biases toward outgroups 
(e.g., Brewer, 1999). However, I expected this main effect to be qualified by an interaction of 
number and group membership. In particular, when deciding to harm one’s ingroup, I expected 
participants to be sensitive to number in an intuitive way: harming a group of ingroup members 
should be less likely than harming a single ingroup member. I reasoned that because ingroups are 
often perceived to be less homogenous than outgroups (Park & Rothbart, 1982; Linville, Fischer, 
& Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990; Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, & Li, 1993), that ingroup 
groups may be perceived as multiple individuals with high levels of experience and, thus, 
difficult to harm.  For outgroups, however, I expected number to be important in a 
counterintuitive way. Because outgroups are often perceived as homogenous they may be more 
likely to be attributed a group mind with low levels of experience. This should make harming an 
outgroup group easier than harming an outgroup individual.  
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 Data collection for Study 1 had already begun at the time of my dissertation proposal. 
First I will report the pattern of findings that was apparent in the partial sample at the time of my 
proposal, then I will report the final results with the full sample.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 297 students
1
 in a marketing course at University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill who completed the study for course credit.
 
I collected part of this sample (N = 119) 
before my dissertation proposal and completed data collection in the following semester.  
Design 
 The design was a 2(Group Membership of Collateral Damage: ingroup vs. outgroup) X 
2(Amount of Collateral Damage: 1 vs. 11 people harmed) factorial design with both factors 
manipulated between-subjects. 
Procedure 
 After agreeing to an electronic informed consent participants learned that there would be 
an attention check within the study. Next participants read a brief piece of information about the 
controversy of drone strikes launched by America abroad. They also learned that they would be 
asked to make a decision about a drone strike in a hypothetical scenario that would follow. 
 Participants were then given a scenario in which they had to decide whether to launch a 
drone strike in an area of Afghanistan. This strike would kill a known terrorist leader, but would 
also cause varying amounts of collateral damage. Some learned that the drone would kill 11 
innocent Afghan civilians, some learned the drone would kill 11 innocent American civilians, 
some learned the drone would kill one identified Afghan civilian, and some learned the drone 
                                                                
1
Although our target minimum sample size was 200 students, we continued collecting data until the end of the last 
week dedicated to data collection leading to a larger sample. 
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would kill one identified American civilian (see Appendix for wording). Identified single victims 
were identified through a first and last name. Participants indicated how much they supported the 
drone strike (“How supportive would you be of the decision to go ahead with this drone strike?) 
and how approving they would be of the drone strike (“How approving would you be of this 
drone strike?”) on 1 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) sliding scales. Participants also were asked to 
imagine that the decision was time urgent and that they needed to make a forced choice of “Yes” 
or “No.” 
 Directly after making this forced choice rating, participants were asked to report how 
similar Americans are to one another and how similar Afghans are to one another on a 1 (not at 
all) to 100 (extremely) sliding scale as a measure of group homogeneity. Participants completed 
the study by indicating whether they identified as an American and reported other demographic 
information such as gender, overall political conservatism, and separate items for social and 
economic conservatism. Finally, they completed the attention check which instructed them to 
ignore the actual statements on that survey page (“This study was easy to complete,” “This study 
was worthwhile,” and “This study was confusing”) and instead respond with 1 (strongly 
disagree) to all questions. 
Results  
Preliminary Analyses 
 Endorsement of launching the drone was calculated as the average of three items: 
approval for launching the drone, support for launching the drone, and the forced choice of 
whether to launch the drone (-1 = no; 1 = yes). Before averaging these variables together they 
were standardized; thus, endorsement is expressed in z scores. These three items were highly 
reliable (α = .93).  
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Main Analyses Partial Sample (N = 119) 
 At the time of the proposal I had collected about half of the desired sample. To test my 
main hypothesis on the partial sample, I conducted a 2 (Group Membership of Collateral 
Damage: ingroup vs. outgroup) X 2 (Number of Collateral Damage: 1 vs. 11) between-subjects 
ANOVA predicting endorsement of harm. First, a main effect of group membership of the target 
revealed that participants were less likely to harm American targets (M = -.19; 95% CI [-
.42, .05]) than Afghani targets (M = .20; 95% CI [-.04, .44]), F(1, 115) = 5.17, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. 
The predicted interaction was not significant but the means were in the predicted direction, F(1, 
115) = 1.31, p = .25, ηp2 = .01 (see Figure 1). In particular, means indicated a diverging effect of 
number of people harmed based on group membership. Groups of Americans were less likely to 
be harmed (M = -.29; 95% CI[ -.42, .05]) than an individual American (M = -.08; 95% CI[-
.42, .26]). This pattern was reversed for outgroup members. In particular, groups of Afghan 
civilians were descriptively more likely to be harmed (M = .29; 95% CI [.05, .63]) than an 
individual Afghan civilian (M = .12; 95% CI[-.23, .45]). This pattern of effects was consistent 
with my hypotheses. 
Main Analyses Full Sample (N = 297) 
After the proposal, data collection was completed. Using the full sample, I again ran the 
2(Group Membership of Collateral Damage: ingroup vs. outgroup) X 2(Number of Collateral 
Damage: 1 vs. 11) between-subjects ANOVA predicting endorsement of harm. Results of this 
analysis now revealed two main effects but the predicted interaction was not significant (see 
Figure 2). A main effect for group membership indicated that participants were less likely to 
endorse the drone strike when potential victims were from America (M = -.22; 95% CI [-.37, -
.08]) as compared to from Afghanistan (M = .23; 95% CI [.08, .38]), F(1, 291) = 18.14, p < .001, 
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ηp
2
= .06. The main effect of number indicated that participants were less likely to endorse the 
drone strike when it would harm many people (M = -.12; 95% CI [-.27, .02]) as compared to a 
single individual (M = .13; 95% CI [-.02, .28]), F(1, 291) = 5.64, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .02. The 
predicted interaction of group membership X number was not significant, F(1, 291) = .11, p 
= .74, ηp
2
= .00. Thus, inconsistent with the pattern in the partial sample, group membership did 
not moderate the effect of number of potential victims on endorsement of harm. Instead, 
participants showed an ingroup bias, avoiding harming ingroup members more so than outgroup 
members. Furthermore, reflecting predominantly utilitarian motives, participants seemed 
motivated to minimize harm overall. 
Discussion 
 In a Preliminary Study, I tested whether, in the context of outgroups, people may be more 
likely to harm many than one. Results revealed two intuitive main effects, but not the predicted 
interaction of group membership and number. In particular, participants were less likely to harm 
groups as compared to individuals and showed a general preference for the ingroup such that 
drone strikes were less likely to be endorsed when the collateral damage would be people from 
America as compared to people from Afghanistan. These findings are consistent with research on 
harm aversion (Baron, 1995) such that participants were more reticent to harm many than one as 
well as intergroup biases such that participants were more averse to harming ingroup members 
than outgroup members (Brewer, 1999).  
 Although my prediction that outgroup groups may elicit greater harm than outgroup 
individuals was not supported in Study 1, there are a variety of reasons why I may not have 
found evidence for my hypothesis. One possibility is that the very political nature of the scenario 
means that many motivations (e.g., utilitarian motives, views on war, social 
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liberalism/conservativism, etc.) were likely operating. For example, it is possible that only those 
with high levels of prejudice toward people from Afghanistan, positive attitudes toward drone 
strikes, or who are in support of the war in Afghanistan would be motivated to harm many 
outgroup members more than one. Because I did not measure these factors, I was unable to 
examine their potential role as moderators. Furthermore, because people in general have such a 
strong aversion to causing physical harm, utilitarian motives may, under most circumstances, 
overwhelm factors that may otherwise lead people to harm groups of people. Perhaps more 
subtle sources of harm, such as reputational or financial harm, would be more susceptible to 
motives distinct from utilitarianism. 
   Because the Preliminary Study did not support my hypothesis that outgroup groups 
would be harmed more than individuals, in Study 1, I tested my second hypothesis that people 
would exhibit differential mind perception of groups as compared to individuals from those 
groups. Previous research on mind perception has found that mind perception can be explained 
by two distinct factors: experience and agency. In the following study, I thus examined 
perceptions of experience and agency for groups and individuals from a variety of categories. I 
expected that people may find it more difficult to consider groups having a mind in terms of 
experience and thus, groups may be attributed lower capacities for experience than individuals 
from those groups. For individual targets I included both identified (by name) and unidentified 
individuals. Because groups are often unidentified (i.e., individual members are not referenced 
by name) this allowed me to test whether any differences in mind perception between groups and 
individuals is driven by differences in identification rather than being perceived as a group.   
 Finally, previous research indicates that motivations can affect what type of mind people 
tune into when evaluating outgroups. In particular, Waytz and Young (2014) found that giving 
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people motivations to affiliate with an outgroup, such as China, led people to preferentially focus 
on China’s capacity for mind in terms of experience. Conversely, when given motivation to 
predict China’s behaviors, which they term effectance motivation, people preferentially focused 
on understanding China’s capacity for mind in terms of agency. To extend upon these findings I 
tested whether motivations in the form of prejudice toward particular social categories might bias 
perceptions of an outgroup’s capacity for different types of mind. In particular, I reasoned that 
people may be particularly likely to perceive groups as having less mind than individuals when 
prejudice toward the overarching category is high. If this is the case, then future research could 
test whether such systematic dehumanization may serve to justify widespread harm that people 
desire to enact because of their prejudice. 
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1 
 
 In Study 1 I examined perceptions of experience and agency of groups and individuals 
from 19 different categories (e.g., companies, national groups, racial/ethnic groups etc.). Overall, 
I predicted that groups would be attributed less mind in terms of experience than either identified 
or unidentified individuals from those groups. 
 Additionally, for the racial/ethnic categories, I included measures of prejudice in order to 
examine whether greater prejudice moderates reduced ascription of mind to groups as compared 
to individuals from those categories. I reasoned that perceiving disliked groups as low in the 
capacity to experience could be one way that people justify widespread harm toward disliked 
groups. Other recent research has found that motivations can affect which types of mind people 
attend to (Waytz & Young, 2014). Here, I attempted to extend these existing findings to examine 
how motivations affect perceptions of an underlying capacity for different types of mind.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 177 workers
2
 collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) who 
received $.55 in exchange for completing the study. Participants were, on average, in their early 
30s (M = 33), a majority female (60%), and White (81%). 
                                                                
2Although we posted enough payments for 180 workers, three participants did not submit valid completion 
codes. Thus, they were paid, but did not appear to have completed the study.  
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Design  
 Participants made ratings of a randomly selected type of target (group, identified 
individual, unidentified individual) on mind attributions in terms of both agency and experience 
across 19 categories. Each participant made ratings of all 19 categories; however for each 
category, participants only rated either an individual or a group. 
Procedure 
 After signing an informed consent and completing a brief attention check, participants 
learned that they would read about a variety of social targets and be asked to rate to what degree 
each target is capable of things such as self-control or pain and pleasure. Next, participants rated 
19 different social targets. Seven of these targets were taken from previous work on mind 
perception of individuals (Gray et al., 2007; i.e., dog, wild animal, baby, young girl, dead woman, 
robot, person in vegetative state), five targets represented companies (i.e., accounting company, 
advertising agency, Google, Facebook, investment firm), and six targets were racial/cultural 
groups (i.e., Afghans, Americans, Canadians, Russians, Black Americans, and White Americans). 
Finally, one target was a sports team. Participants rated each of these targets on 8 items which 
assessed different perceptions of mind on 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) sliding scales. Four 
items assessed capacities for experience (i.e., perceived capacity for hunger, physical or 
emotional pain, physical or emotional pleasure, and fear) and four items assessed capacities for 
agency (i.e., perceived capacity for planning, exercising self-control, remembering, and acting 
morally). Participants were randomly selected to rate either a group, unidentified individual or 
identified individual separately for each of the 19 categories. 
 Participants completed the study by reporting their attitudes toward Arabs, Afghans, 
Canadians, Black Americans and White Americans using feeling thermometers. In particular 
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participants rated their feelings toward each target from 0 (cold/unfavorable) to 100 
(warm/favorable). Participants concluded the study by reporting demographic information and 
receiving a randomly generated completion code to enter on Mturk in order to receive their 
subject payments. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 First, I calculated perceptions of agency and experience separately for each type of target 
by averaging responses across the four items assessing agency (α = .94) and the four items 
assessing experience (α = .95). Higher numbers on both experience (M = 70.75, SD = 35.79) and 
agency (M = 61.87, SD = 33.30) indicate greater mind perception. 
Main Analyses 
 Mind Perception across Targets. First I collapsed across type of target and plotted the 
means and 95% confidence intervals separately for ratings of agency and experience for groups, 
unidentified individuals, and identified individuals. As can be seen in Figure 3, results revealed 
the predicted effect of type of target on mind perception. In particular, overall, groups were rated 
as significantly lower in experience (M = 58.89; 95% CI [56.85, 60.94]) and agency (M = 55.41; 
95% CI [53.48, 57.35]) than either identified or unidentified individuals. However ratings of 
identified individuals on both experience (M = 76.71; 95% CI [74.67 78.74]) and agency (M = 
65.07; 95% CI [63.14, 66.99]) did not differ from ratings of unidentified individuals on 
experience (M = 76.63; 95% CI [74.59, 78.68]) and agency (M = 65.07; 95% CI [63.13, 67.01]).   
As can be seen in Figure 3, reduction of mind attribution to groups as compared to individuals 
was particularly strong for perceptions of experience. In sum, across the 19 categories, groups 
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were rated as significantly lower in experience than either identified or unidentified individuals. 
Identified and unidentified individuals did not significantly differ from one another. 
 Interestingly, when I looked at the 95 % confidence intervals separately for each type of 
target, the predicted pattern of reduced mind attribution to groups, especially in terms of 
experience, was particularly apparent and consistent toward the five different types of companies 
that were included in the study (see Figure 4). In particular, for each company, the company as a 
whole was rated as significantly lower in experience and agency than either the identified or the 
unidentified individuals. Consistent with hypotheses, this reduced mind perception of companies, 
as compared to individual company members, was significantly stronger for perceptions of 
experience. (Summary statistics of mind perception for non-company categories appear in Table 
1.) 
 Motivated Mind Perception of Groups Versus Individuals. Next, I examined whether 
greater levels of prejudice toward the different national/racial categories moderated the effect of 
type of target (i.e., group, unidentified individual, identified individual) on perceptions of mind. 
In particular, I hypothesized that those with the highest levels of prejudice toward the category 
may be most likely to attribute lower experience to groups as compared to individuals from those 
categories. I tested this hypothesis by conducting separate one-way (Type of Target: group, 
identified individual, unidentified individual) ANOVAs for each national/racial category 
predicting perceptions of experience and agency. To examine moderation by prejudice, I added 
responses on a feeling thermometer (coded so that higher values indicate greater prejudice or 
feeling “cold” toward the target) as a continuous covariate. This continuous covariate was 
allowed to interact with condition. 
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 Results of these analyses revealed that for ratings of Black Americans, White Americans, 
Canadians, and people from Afghanistan, the Type of Target X Prejudice interaction did not 
significantly predict perceptions of experience or agency, all Fs > 1. This finding conflicts with 
my hypothesis that people with higher levels of prejudice toward a particular social category may 
be motivated to ascribe less experience to groups from that category as compared to an 
individual from that category as a way to justify widespread harm.  
 Interestingly, there was a main effect of level of prejudice on perceptions of both 
experience and agency for each category. In particular, across all national/racial categories, 
people with higher levels of prejudice toward that category also perceived less experience and 
agency in the mind of that social category regardless of the type of target (see Table 2). In sum, 
although prejudice did not lead to reduced mind attribution to groups more than individuals, 
prejudice did decrease perceptions of both agency and experience for all of the national/racial 
categories examined.   
Discussion 
 Across 19 different categories, results indicated that groups were perceived as having 
different types of minds than individuals. In particular, groups were attributed significantly less 
experience and agency than individuals from those groups regardless of whether those 
individuals were identified by name. Critically, as predicted, reduced mind perception of groups 
was particularly strong for perceptions of experience. Together, these findings indicate that 
participants found it particularly difficult to consider groups in general as having experiences 
such as pleasure and pain and that differences in mind perception for groups as compared to 
individuals was not driven by whether individuals were identified by name. 
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 In Study 1, I also tested whether prejudice toward social categories may drive reduced 
ascription of mind to groups from those categories as compared to individuals from those 
categories. I reasoned that such a pattern of findings would be consistent with motivated mind 
perception such that people with greater prejudice may be motivated to ascribe less mind to 
groups in order to justify harming more people from disliked categories. I did not find evidence 
for this hypothesis. Instead there was simply a main effect of prejudice such that greater 
prejudice toward the category led to less ascriptions of mind in terms of both experience and 
agency regardless of the type of target (i.e., group or individual). This is consistent with other 
research which finds that people engage in motivated mind perception. For example, research 
has indicated that when participants learned that their ingroup engaged in a massive killing of 
outgroup members, they subsequently denied that outgroup emotional experiences—especially 
emotional experiences that had been linked to humanity in previous research (Castano & Giner-
Sorollo, 2006). 
 Although I examined many different types of categories, the pattern of reduced mind 
perception for groups was particularly strong among the five categories that were companies. 
These companies included specific companies such as Google and Facebook as well as generic 
companies such as an “accounting company.” An interesting implication of this finding is that, 
despite the fact that the U.S. government has decided that corporations should have some of the 
rights traditionally reserved for individuals (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
2010), it appears that people do not ascribe mental capacities to companies as a whole. Because 
of the topical relevance of mind perception of companies, and the consistent pattern of effects for 
companies, in Study 2, I focused on mind perception of a company and attempted to link this to 
decisions to harm the company. In particular, I expanded upon my Study 1 findings in three ways.   
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 First, I attempted to replicate the finding that groups are attributed less mind in terms of 
experience than individuals. However in addition to comparing perceptions of a group with an 
individual, I also added in another group condition that altered the focus of participants from the 
group as a whole to the collection of individuals that compose the group. This subtle 
manipulation stems from some of my related research which has found that entitative groups (i.e., 
those described as high in proximity, similarity, and common fate; Campbell, 1958) are 
attributed less mind in terms of experience than less entitative groups. In particular, in previous 
unpublished data I have found that 5 colleagues headed to the same business meeting (an 
entitative group) are rated as significantly lower in experience than 5 people headed to separate 
business meetings (a non-entitative group; Cooley & Payne, unpublished data). Thus, it seemed 
possible that reduced attributions of experience for groups as compared to an individual would 
be strongest when participants were led to focus on the group as a whole as compared to the 
individuals that compose the group.  
 A second purpose of Study 2 was to ascertain whether reduced mind perception for 
companies as compared to individuals within those companies was driven by stereotypes that 
people hold about companies in general. For example, some have argued that companies tend to 
be stereotyped as cool and calculating and that this may drive differences in mind perception 
(Phelan, Arico, & Nichols, 2012; Rai & Diermeier, 2015). Consistent with this possibility, in 
previous research, I have found that groups tend to accentuate the activation of stereotypes more 
than individuals (Cooley, Payne, & Insko, under review). Thus, it is possible that companies as a 
group were perceived more stereotypically than individuals from those groups and that this was 
driving differences in mind perception in Study 1. Despite these arguments, I did not expect that 
stereotypes would account for differences in mind perception of companies. Instead, it seems 
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more likely that mind perception is a prerequisite for stereotyping to occur. For example, if 
someone does not have the capacity to experience emotional pleasure or pain, it should be 
unlikely that judgments of emotional warmth will be relevant. However, to statistically rule out 
this alternative explanation, Study 2 directly measured and controlled for stereotyping of 
companies. In particular, I measured stereotyping along two dimensions under which previous 
research indicates that all stereotypes can be organized: warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, 
& Glick, 2007). These two dimensions of stereotyping are particularly appropriate in the present 
research because of the surface similarity of stereotypes of warmth with mind attributions of 
experience and stereotypes of competence with mind attributions of agency. Because of the 
surface similarity of these constructs, demonstrating that differences in mind perception of 
companies occur above and beyond stereotypes would provide strong support for my hypotheses. 
 Finally, I examined whether differences in mind perception of groups, leads people to be 
more likely to endorse harm of groups. In particular, I predicted that a company described as an 
entitative group would be attributed less experience than a company described as a collection of 
individuals or a single individual working for the company. Because perceptions of experience 
have been shown to be negatively correlated with decisions to harm in previous research (Gray et 
al., 2007), I further predicted that people would be most likely to endorse harm of the company 
described as an entitative group. Such a finding would be interesting because it would mean that 
sometimes people are more likely to endorse harm of many than one.  
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 2 
 
 In Study 2, I had multiple goals. First, I examined whether decreased perceptions of 
experience for companies in Study 1 was driven by cues to being an entitative group. To do this, 
Study 2 compared mind perception of a company as a whole (group-focus) with mind perception 
of a collection of individuals who comprised the company (group-composition-focus) or an 
individual working for the company (individual-focus). I hypothesized that the company in the 
group-focus condition would be rated as the lowest in experience due to the perception of a 
single group mind, while the company in the group-composition focus would be rated as the 
highest in experience due to the perception of multiple individual minds. I expected perceptions 
of the experience of an individual to fall between these two conditions. Second, I examined 
whether decreased mind perception of groups in terms of experience mediated greater harm of 
groups. Finally, I attempted to differentiate mind perception of experience and agency from 
stereotypes of warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) by measuring and then 
controlling for stereotypes in analyses of mind perception.  
Method 
Participants 
 For the analyses examining mind perception, I eliminated one participant who did not 
complete the items measuring mind in terms of experience. The final sample consisted of 249 
workers from Mturk who were paid $.55 for completing the study. On average participants were 
31 years of age, a majority female (46%) and White (84%). 
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Design  
 Study 2 was a one-way (Type of Target: group-focus, group-composition focus, 
individual-focus) between-subjects design. The main dependent variables were the same items 
measuring perceptions of experience and agency as in Study 1 as well as decisions to cause 
reputational harm.  
Procedure 
 After signing an electronic informed consent, participants completed a brief attention 
check and then were randomly assigned to read about a small accounting company in New York 
or an individual from that company. Those who read about the company read one of two 
descriptions of the company that varied only slightly in focus. The group-focus condition 
emphasized the company as a group (i.e., “an accounting company comprised of 15 people”) and 
the group-composition focus emphasized the multiple individuals that composed the company 
(i.e., “15 people who compose the accounting company”). Next participants rated their randomly 
assigned target on the same four items assessing experience and agency as used in Study 1 as 
well as four items assessing stereotypes of warmth (i.e., unfriendly, insensitive, sociable, caring) 
and four items assessing stereotypes of competence (i.e., skilled, capable, disorganized, lazy). 
Ratings of mind and stereotypes appeared in a randomly generated order and were answered on -
10 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) scales.  
 To assess decisions to harm, participants were next given a hypothetical scenario 
involving the accounting company. In particular, participants learned that the randomly assigned 
type of target had made an error that would allow the participant to financially benefit in a 
completely legal way. Critically, the participant also learned that the more that he or she chose to 
financially benefit, the more reputational harm would be caused to the randomly assigned target. 
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The participant was then asked to choose how much he or she would decide to financially benefit 
from the mistake. In particular, the participant could choose to benefit $15,000 and cause severe 
reputational damage (1), benefit $10,000 and cause moderate reputational damage (2), benefit 
$5,000 and cause mild damage (3), or take no action (4). Finally participants reported how 
similar they thought employees of the accounting company were to one another, a measure of 
implicit emotions, and demographic information before being debriefed (see Appendix for all 
materials). 
Results  
Preliminary Analyses 
 As in Study 1, one of the main dependent variables was perceptions of mental capacities 
for agency and experience. I calculated perceptions of agency and experience by calculating the 
average response across the four items assessing agency (α = .87) and the four items assessing 
experience (α = .93). Higher numbers on both experience (M = 5.57, SD = 4.71) and agency (M 
= 6.02, SD = 3.10) indicate greater perceptions of experience and agency. Next, I calculated 
average stereotypes of warmth (M = 2.28, SD = 3.06) and competence (M = 4.46, SD = 2.95) so 
that I could examine the effect of condition on mind perception above and beyond the influence 
of stereotypes. Both measures of warmth and competence were relatively reliable (α = .73; α 
= .75 respectively). The other dependent variable was one item assessing decisions to harm 
which was reverse coded so that higher numbers indicated greater harm (M = 1.99, SD = 1.12). 
Main Analyses 
 Mind Perception. First I tested my hypothesis that participants in the group-focus 
condition would attribute less experience to the company as compared to those in the group-
composition focus or the individual-focus conditions. I tested this hypothesis with two one-way 
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(Type of Target: group-focus, group-composition focus, individual-focus) ANOVAs predicting 
average mind perception in terms of experience and agency separately. These analyses revealed 
that the type of target affected both perceptions of experience, F(2, 246) = 30.34, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .20, as well as agency, F(2, 246) = 6.36, p = .002 (see Figure 5). Thus, I next explored the 
difference in perceptions of experience and agency for each pairwise contrast.  
 First I compared mind perception in the group-focus condition with mind perception in 
the group-composition focus or the individual-focus conditions. Consistent with hypotheses, and 
with Study 1, the group-focus condition yielded lower ratings of experience (M = 2.67; 95% 
CI[4.40, 5.71]) than the group-composition focus condition (M = 7.53; 95% CI[6.60, 8.46]), F(1, 
161) = 46.81, p < 001, ηp
2 
= .23), or the individual-focus condition (M = 6.56; 95% CI[5.66, 
7.46] ), F(1, 167) = 29.18, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .15. Interestingly, the group-focus condition also led to 
lower ratings of agency (M = 5.05; 95% CI [4.40, 5.71]) than the group-composition focus (M = 
6.41; 95% CI [5.74, 7.08]), F(1, 161) = 7.80, p = .006, ηp
2 
= .05), or the individual focus (M = 
6.59; 95% CI [5.94, 7.23] ), F(1, 167) = 10.21, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .06.  Thus, consistent with 
hypotheses, companies, when described as a group, were attributed less experience than the same 
company construed as multiple individuals. Replicating the results of Study 1, companies, 
described as a group, were also attributed less experience than a single individual from the 
company. Interestingly, this pattern of findings replicated for perceptions of agency. However, as 
can be seen in Figure 5, the effect of reduced mind attribution for companies was most 
pronounced for perceptions of experience. This was confirmed by a one-way (Type of Target: 
group-focus, group-composition-focus, individual-focus) repeated measures ANOVA predicting 
ratings of experience and agency as a within-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a significant 
Type of Target X Type of Mind interaction, F(1, 246) = 7.33, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .06. Thus, 
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consistent with predictions, companies described as an entitative group were particularly likely 
to be attributed low levels of mind, especially in terms of experience.  
 Next I compared mind attribution in the group-composition focus condition with mind 
perception in the individual-focus condition. Interestingly, the group-composition focus 
condition yielded significantly greater ratings of experience than the individual-focus condition, 
F(1, 164) = 3.45, p = .07, ηp
2 
= .02. However, ratings of the agency did not differ between these 
two conditions, F(1, 164) = .15, p = .70, ηp
2
 = .00.  
 In sum, leading people to focus on the 15 people that composed the company led to the 
greatest amount of mind perception in terms of experience. However, leading people to focus on 
the company as a whole led to the least amount of mind in terms of both agency and experience.  
 Stereotypes and Mind Perception. Next I examined the possibility that decreased 
attributions of experience and agency to the company as a whole may be driven by greater 
application of corporate stereotypes to groups as compared to individuals. To test this I re-ran 
separate one-way (Type of Target: group-focus, group-composition-focus, individual-focus) 
between-subjects ANOVAs predicting mind perception in terms of both agency and experience; 
but, this time, added warmth and competence into the model as standardized covariates. These 
analyses revealed the same pattern of effects when controlling for stereotyping. In particular, 
condition predicted both perceptions of experience F(2, 244) = 34.47, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .22, and 
agency, F(2, 244) = 5.48, p = .005, ηp
2 
= .04.  Critically, the pattern of effects remained identical 
to the model without warmth and competence added as covariates (see Table 3). These findings 
indicate that variations in mind perception are occurring independently from stereotypes.  
 Harm. Finally, I examined whether groups were more likely to be harmed than 
individuals in a one-way (Type of Target: group-focus, group-composition focus, individual-
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focus) ANOVA predicting decisions to harm. Results revealed a significant effect of condition 
on decisions to harm, F(2, 246) = 5.04, p = .007, ηp
2 
= .04. As can be seen in Figure 6, 
participants in the group-composition focus condition were significantly more likely to cause 
harm (M = 2.31; 95% CI [2.07, 2.56]) than participants in the group-focus condition (M = 1.87; 
95% CI [1.64, 2.12]) or the individual-focus condition (M = 1.80; 95% CI [1.57, 2.04]). Thus, 
although a group described as a collection of 15 people was attributed the greatest amount of 
experience, they were also most likely to be harmed-- even more so than a single individual.  In 
fact, contrary to hypotheses, this greater harm for 15 people was completely independent of mind 
attributions such that neither ratings of experience [r(1, 249) = -.07, p = .27] nor agency [r(1, 
249) = .00, p = .98) predicted decisions to harm. 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, as in Study 1, I found that a group was attributed less mind in terms of both 
agency and experience, but especially experience, as compared to an individual from that group. 
Furthermore, I found that reduced mind perception of the group was driven by considering the 
group as an entitative whole rather than a collection of individuals. In particular, describing the 
company as a “company composed of 15 people” led to significantly lower ratings of experience 
and agency than describing the same company as “15 individuals who comprise the company.” 
In fact, the latter description led to significantly higher perceptions of experience as compared to 
ratings of a single individual. Thus, even a very minor manipulation of focus, either on the 
company as a whole or all of the individuals that compose the company, had big effects on mind 
perception in terms of experience. 
 In Study 2, I also extended Study 1 findings by directly testing whether reduced mind 
perception of groups is driven by stereotypes of the particular type of group in question. This 
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possibility is consistent with other research which indicates that groups accentuate the activation 
of stereotypes (Cooley, Payne, & Insko, under review). Thus, companies described as a group 
may be perceived more stereotypically than a single individual or multiple individuals who 
compose the company, and this may drive differences in mind perception. Critically, I found that 
even when I controlled for perceptions of the warmth and competence of the target, companies 
described as a group continued to be attributed significantly lower levels of experience and 
agency than the company described as multiple individuals or an individual. 
 Although results supported my hypotheses regarding differences in mind perception for 
groups, results were more complicated for decisions to harm. Consistent with hypotheses, overall 
participants caused more harm to many than one. However, inconsistent with hypotheses, this 
finding was driven by the fact that participants endorsed the most harm toward the company 
described a collection of individuals. This pattern of results indicates that, indeed, people are 
sometimes more likely to harm many than one. However, decisions to harm were completely 
independent of perceptions of mind in terms of experience. In fact, participants were most likely 
to harm the target that was attributed the most experience.  
 In sum, the results of Study 2 provide evidence for two separate phenomena. First, 
entitativity drives reductions in mind perception such that an entitative group is attributed less 
capacity for experience than a group described as a collection of individuals or a single 
individual. Second, under certain conditions, people seem more willing to harm many than one. 
These finding are interesting because other research has argued that high entitativity groups, as 
compared to low entitativity groups, are more likely to be perceived as a single entity whose 
behavior is driven by intentions (O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002) and perceived as having greater 
mind in terms of agency (Waytz & Young, 2012). I am finding that a group described as a single 
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unit, is attributed less mind in terms of both experience and agency than a group described in a 
less entitative way. Importantly reduced mind for the entitative group was particularly strong for 
attributions of experience. 
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Mind perception is central to morality (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). To be compelled 
to help another person one must first perceive that person as being capable of experiencing 
physical or emotional pain or struggle. Similarly, to perceive that one has caused harm, one must 
first perceive a mind to experience that harm. In the present research I tested whether groups of 
people are attributed less mind than individuals, especially in terms of the ability to have 
experiences such as pleasure and pain. Given the link between mind perception and moral 
decision making, and the link between perceptions of experience and harm more specifically, I 
further tested whether reduced attributions of experience to groups leads people to harm groups 
of people--sometimes more readily than a single individual.  
 First, in a Preliminary Study, I tested whether people are more likely to endorse harm of 
many than one. In particular, I hypothesized that groups, and especially groups of outgroup 
members, might be more vulnerable to harm than an individual. Although I did not directly 
measure mind perception in this Preliminary Study, my reasoning was that outgroup groups may 
be perceived as more homogenous and thus more likely to be perceived as having a unified 
group mind rather than multiple individual minds. Because I expected that group mind would be 
perceived as particularly low on experience, I reasoned that outgroup groups might be more 
likely to be harmed than an outgroup individual. For ingroups I expected decisions to be driven 
by utilitarian motives such that participants would be less likely to harm many than one. 
Although preliminary data were supportive of this pattern of results, the full sample was not. 
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Instead, results revealed that people were more likely to harm outgroups than ingroups and more 
likely to harm an individual than a group. Thus, participants indicated a preference for the 
ingroup (Brewer, 1999) and for minimizing harm (Baron, 1995)—two well-known effects. 
Because the results of the Preliminary Study did not support hypotheses, in the following study 
(Study 1) I directly tested my second hypothesis: that groups may be attributed less mind, 
especially less experience, than individuals. 
 To measure mind perception in Study 1, I examined perceptions of both agency and 
experience of groups and individuals from a broad range of categories. In particular, participants 
were randomly assigned to rate either a group, an identified individual, or an unidentified 
individual from each of 19 categories. Overall, supportive of hypotheses, groups were attributed 
less capacity to experience than individuals. Interestingly, this pattern of reduced mind 
perception of groups was apparent for perceptions of both experience and agency, but the effects 
were particularly strong in terms of ratings of experience.  
 Study 1 findings were noteworthy in that they were the first to show reduced mind 
perception of groups in terms of both agency and experience across many different types of 
categories and to compare mind perception of groups with both identified and unidentified 
individuals from those groups.  Results revealed that reduced mind perception of groups does not 
seem to be driven by the fact that individuals are often identified. Instead, as predicted, groups 
were rated as significantly lower in experience, than either an identified or an unidentified 
individual from that group. Furthermore, mind perception of identified and unidentified 
individuals did not tend to differ. Thus, although research indicates that identifying a victim 
affects moral decisions to help (Jenni & Loewenstein, 2003), identifying an individual does not 
seem to affect mind perception. 
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 Interestingly, reduced mind perception for groups as compared to individuals was 
particularly strong for the five categories that represented companies. Such a finding is 
noteworthy for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, understanding how people 
perceive mind in companies is directly relevant to the common “corporations are people” 
rhetoric that has been popular since the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 
ruling that corporations would be granted individual rights. Theoretically, these findings indicate 
that something about companies in particular might drive reduced mind perception of companies 
as compared to individuals from those companies. In Study 2, I addressed two plausible reasons 
for the strong and consistent effects for companies. One possible explanation is that companies 
tend to be perceived as a particularly entitative, or unified, group. This possibility is consistent 
with my reasoning that the more entitative a group, the more likely it will be to be attributed a 
group mind and thus low levels of experience. A second potential explanation is that people hold 
stereotypes of companies as cold and calculating, and that these stereotypes lead people to 
perceive companies as particular low in experience. To test both of these possibilities in Study 2, 
I directly manipulated whether the company was construed as an entitative group and measured 
its effects on perceptions of experience; furthermore, I directly measured stereotyping of 
companies. 
 In Study 2 participants were randomly assigned to either rate a company described as a 
group [i.e., an accounting company (comprised of 15 people)], a company described as a 
collection of individuals [i.e., 15 people (who work for an accounting company)], or an 
individual on dimensions on experience and agency. Additionally I measured stereotyping of the 
randomly assigned target on dimensions of warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 
2007). Results revealed, as predicted, that the company described as a group was rated as 
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significantly lower in experience than the company described as multiple individuals or the 
individual. The same pattern of results held for perceptions of agency. However, as in Study 1, 
reduced mind perception of groups was much stronger for perceptions of experience than agency. 
This finding is consistent with my hypothesis that entitative groups may be particularly likely to 
be considered as having a group mind that is low in experience. In fact, the company described 
as a collection of individuals was rated as significantly higher in experience than the company 
described as an entitative group or an individual. These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that entitative groups will be attributed a group mind (which I find is perceived as low 
in experience), but that collections of individuals may actually be perceived as multiple 
individual minds and thus higher in perceptions of experience.  
 Critically, results did not change when I controlled for stereotypes in my statistical 
analyses. Thus, it does not seem that reduced perceptions of experience for companies as a whole 
are driven by stereotypes of companies as low in warmth. Instead, I would propose that the 
perception that an entity has the mental capacities for experience and agency might be a 
necessary prerequisite for developing stereotypes, but not an indication of whether stereotypes 
will form. After all, if an entity does not have a mind then it does not make much sense to 
attribute stereotypes such as “caring” or “conscientious” to that entity. Similarly, having the 
capacity to understand others’ emotions does not mean someone will be caring, nor does having 
the capacity to plan mean that someone will be “conscientious.” 
 Interestingly, Study 2 also revealed that sometimes people do harm many more readily 
than one. In particular, participants were more likely to harm the company described as a 
collection of individuals than the company described as an entitative group or a single individual. 
Thus, unlike in the Preliminary Study in which people strove to minimize harm, participants in 
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Study 2 were more likely to harm multiple individuals than a single individual. One reason for 
this discrepancy may be that the Preliminary Study examined a more extreme form of harm (i.e., 
killing) versus the less extreme reputational harm in Study 2. Perhaps, then, the extremity of the 
harm to be caused moderates the effect of number of victims on decisions to harm. 
 Interestingly, although the Study 2 finding of greater harm for many than one supported 
the hypothesis that sometimes people will behave in a non-utilitarian way, it also diverged with 
my hypothesis that that the company as a group would be most likely to be harmed due to 
decreased perceptions of experience for groups. Instead participants were most likely to harm the 
target that was attributed the greatest amount of experience---the collection of individuals. In fact, 
decisions to harm were completely independent of mind perception. What, then, might have 
driven greater harm of many than one?  
Alternative Mechanisms for Greater Harm of Many than One 
 Although mind attributions, especially in terms of experience, have been linked to 
decisions to harm in previous research (Gray et al., 2007), mind perception is only one of many 
factors that could influence decisions to cause harm. After all, decisions to harm many and 
decisions to harm one differ in myriad ways.  This leaves open the possibility for multiple 
mechanisms that may be simultaneously or individually operating to enable people to make 
decisions to cause harm to multiple people at once. Some possible mechanisms include 
motivated emotion regulation, stronger prejudice toward groups as compared to individuals, and 
differences in the way that harm is conceptualized when directed toward collections of 
individuals, groups, and individuals.  
 First, just as people regulate their compassion to avoid the costly effects of helping 
(Cameron & Payne, 2011) people may also regulate empathy or distress to enable themselves to 
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engage in behaviors that would otherwise challenge their morality—such as harming multiple 
others. Evidence for motivated emotion regulation would come from the finding that those who 
are the least skilled at regulating their emotions are also the most likely to experience more 
distress and/or empathy toward harming many outgroup members as compared to harming one. 
Additionally, those who have the highest levels of intergroup bias (and thereby the most 
motivation to enact intergroup harm) may show lower levels of on-line distress and/or empathy 
when deciding whether to harm a group of outgroup members as compared to an individual 
outgroup member. In this case, people may down-regulate their experience of distress in order to 
justify the widespread harm that they desire to enact. In the context of Study 2, this means that 
people may have down-regulated their experience of distress toward multiple individuals in order 
to justify taking money for the self at the reputational cost of the individuals. Harming a 
company described as a single entity or a single individual may not have elicited these same 
emotion regulation strategies.   
 Another plausible explanation for greater endorsement of harm toward many as 
compared to one is that groups may both relax normal motivations to control prejudice as well as 
enhance negative affect elicited by outgroups. Both of these possibilities are supported by 
previous research which indicates that groups more effectively elicit stereotypes and prejudice 
associated with their social category than do individuals (Cooley, Payne, & Insko, under review; 
Cooley & Payne, in preparation). In this research, enhanced stereotyping for groups was 
particularly pronounced on an explicit measure (as compared to an implicit measure). Because 
explicit measures are vulnerable to the effects of social desirability, high levels of explicit bias 
toward groups indicates that people do not feel pressure to temper their overt intergroup hostility 
when the targets are groups. If groups exacerbate stereotyping and prejudice and also loosen 
  42 
normal constraints of social desirability, then this would lead to a greater possibility of harming 
groups as compared to individuals. This mechanism can be tested by examining whether groups 
(or collections of individuals) elicit greater prejudice and whether this prejudice mediates 
decisions to harm many more readily than one. Although this potential mechanism is worth 
testing in future research, it does not fit perfectly with the pattern of findings in Study 2. In 
particular, this explanation would predict that groups would trigger greater prejudice than 
collections of individuals, thus leading to the greatest harm of a group. However, Study 2 
revealed that the company described as a group elicited less harm than the company described as 
a collection of individuals. 
 A final compelling explanation of my findings stems from the theoretical perspective that 
entitative groups are conceptualized in a way that is more similar to individuals than less 
entitative groups (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Under this conceptualization, reputational harm 
of an entitative group and an individual may both be construed as harm to a single entity which 
may seem more concentrated. In contrast, reputational harm toward a collection of individuals 
may be construed as more diffuse. In particular, if a company described as group is considered to 
be a single unified entity, much like an individual, then reputational harm may seem particularly 
intense when concentrated on a single entity. As a result, people may have avoided harm. 
However, for those who read of the company described as collection of individuals it may have 
been easier to think of the reputational harm as being spread across multiple individuals and thus 
affecting each individual less. Although decisions to harm reflected a similarity in how people 
conceived of an entitative group and an individual, mind perception did not. In particular, the 
mind of entitative groups was perceived to be quite distinct from the mind of an individual. 
Understanding Mind Perception of Groups 
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Given that mind perception is integral to morality (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012), it is 
important to understand variables that influence how we perceive mind in others. Previous 
research on denying others a mind has found that people are particularly likely to dehumanize 
those who belong to outgroups. Building from this work, I also predicted that differential mind 
perception of groups as compared to individuals might be exacerbated for outgroups. Because 
outgroups tend to be perceived of as more homogenous than ingroups (Park & Rothbart, 1982; 
Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990; Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, & Li, 
1993), I reasoned that outgroup groups may be more likely to be perceived as having a group 
mind while ingroup groups might be perceived as multiple individual minds. As a result, I 
predicted that outgroup groups may be attributed particularly low levels of experience and 
agency as compared to ingroup groups and thus may be particularly likely to be harmed. 
However, results did not support this hypothesis in a Preliminary Study.  Instead, people showed 
an overall effect of group membership such that they avoided harming ingroup members more 
than outgroup members regardless of the number of potential victims.  
 Although reduced mind perception of groups did not seem to depend on whether that 
group was an ingroup or an outgroup, the degree to which the group was perceived as 
particularly homogenous or entitative did matter. In fact, in Study 2, even an extremely minor 
manipulation of focus, either on the company as a whole, or the multiple individuals that 
comprise it, had meaningful effects on mind perception and especially attributions mind in terms 
of experience. While entitative groups were perceived as much lower on experience than an 
individual from that group, less entitative groups were perceived as higher in experience. I 
interpret the latter finding as indicating that focusing on multiple individuals leads to increased 
perceptions of mind, as if people are adding together the individual minds of all group members. 
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 This builds upon other research which has compared perceptions of agency (but not 
experience) in groups as compared to group members. In particular, Waytz and Young (2012) 
found that the more agency that is attributed to the group as a whole, the less agency that is 
attributed to its members. Furthermore, this research finds that the more entitative the group, the 
more agency it is ascribed. This finding is consistent with my finding that cues to entitativity 
increase the perception of a unified group mind (Waytz & Young, 2012); however, the meaning 
of a group mind in my research as compared to this previous research, varied in important ways. 
In particular, this previous research only measured mind in terms of agency and found that 
entitativity led to higher ratings of agency; I measured both agency and experience and found 
that entitativity led to lower ratings of agency, and especially low levels of experience as 
compared to a less entitative group or an individual. My findings are consistent with Waytz and 
Young (2012) in that they also found that the average group member was consistently attributed 
more mind than the group as a whole. However, while I found that entitativity decreased 
attributions of mind in terms of both experience and agency, Waytz and Young (2012) found that 
entitative groups were attributed greater agency than less entitative groups. One reason why my 
findings may have conflicted with those of Waytz and Young (2012) is differences in the 
motivations of the perceivers. For example, when Waytz and Young manipulated entitativity 
they used groups of fish, while I used companies. People’s motivations in perceiving mind in 
these two distinct entities likely differ in a variety of ways that could account for the differences 
in mind perception.  
  Consistent with the potential moderating role of motivations in mind perception, other 
research indicates that the motivations of perceivers can affect which type of mind (agency 
versus experience) that perceivers tune into (Waytz & Young, 2014). This research found that 
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when participants were motivated to affiliate with an outgroup, they showed a preferential focus 
on mind in terms of experience; conversely, when motivations to predict behavior predominated, 
participants showed a preferential focus on understanding the outgroup’s mind in terms of 
agency. Thus it is possible that motivations may also affect how people attribute basic mental 
capacities to groups. I found some evidence for this possibility in Study 1 in which I found that 
higher levels of prejudice toward a category led people to attribute both lower levels of 
experience and agency to groups or individuals from that category.  Future research could also 
examine how motivations affect perceptions of different types of mental capacities.   
 In addition to motivational effects on mind perception, other research on dehumanization 
has found that certain types of stereotypes lead people to be more likely to deny others a mind.  
In particular, Fiske and colleagues’ (2007) stereotype content model breaks stereotypes into two 
overarching dimensions of warmth and competence. Groups that are perceived as high in both 
competence and warmth tend to be ingroups, while all other quadrants of the 2-dimensional 
stereotyping space are reserved to different types of outgroups.  Importantly, those outgroups 
that are judged to be both low on warmth and low on competence are the outgroups that are most 
vulnerable to dehumanization. For example, when people look at individuals from these social 
groups (e.g. homeless people) within a fMRI scanner, areas of the brain associated with human 
perception such as the medial prefrontal cortex do not activate above a significant threshold 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006). Related to the present work, some of this research argues that these 
neurological correlates of dehumanization may facilitate intense intergroup conflict such as 
torture and genocide (Harris & Fiske, 2011). Interestingly this research tends to focus on 
perceptions of a single individual from a stereotyped category (e.g., a single homeless man; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006).  However in the present research, I find that being perceived of as a group, 
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independent of stereotypes of warmth and competence, leads to dehumanization. Thus, a more 
basic precursor to dehumanization may be whether I perceive a target as a group or an individual. 
Further research should examine how considering the mental capacities for agency and 
experience of groups versus individuals from particular social categories might lead to different 
neurological activation. For example thinking of a group of people being harmed may not 
activate portions of the brain associated with person perception to the same degree as thinking of 
an individual being harmed. 
Future Directions 
 There are a variety of other interesting research questions that follow from the present 
series of studies. In particular, while the current research examines decisions to harm groups as 
compared to individuals, it does not explicitly address the way that people weight decisions to 
harm groups in pursuit of greater good. However, the prediction that groups may be perceived as 
lower in experience than individuals may have implications for the literature on explicit moral 
trade-offs. For example, in the well-known trolley dilemmas (Foot, 1967), participants learn of a 
runaway train that is about to kill five workers on a train track. Critically, participants have the 
option to push an individual onto the tracks which will kill this individual, but save the five 
workers by stopping the train. Within this dilemma, people struggle to personally kill one to save 
many (Greene et al., 2001). However, one factor that may be driving an aversion to kill one to 
save many may be the emphasis on killing a single individual. Perhaps, if participants were given 
the option to kill three to save ten they may be more likely to make the utilitarian decision. The 
current research also suggests that the portrayal of the three would matter. If the three people are 
conceived of as a group, they may be easier to harm, therefore encouraging a utilitarian choice 
more often than if the three people are conceived of as separate individuals. In this way, 
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attributions of group mind may affect the way people consider the morality of trading some lives 
in order to save many others.  Future research could explore the implications of the present 
research for understanding variables that influence when people will choose utilitarian outcomes.  
 Research should also examine how different levels of mind perception in response to 
groups may affect decisions to help. In particular, research on the collapse of compassion finds 
that people down-regulate their experience of compassion when viewing many suffering victims 
as compared to salient individual who is suffering. However, it is less clear the strategies people 
use in order to down-regulate their compassion toward groups. One interesting possibility is that 
people may down-regulate compassion by attributing less experience to groups of people than 
individuals. Such a finding would provide a new perspective on how we think about the collapse 
of compassion: denying a target the ability to experience pain/suffering may precede, or enable, 
one’s ability to down-regulate compassion toward that target. After all, to feel empathy or 
compassion for another we must first perceive that that other has a mind. 
Conclusion 
 Harming others is something we learn early in our lives not to do without extreme 
justification. And, indeed, most people struggle to respond to moral dilemmas that involve 
deciding to harm one person even for the benefit of many (Foot, 1967; Petrinovich et al., 1993; 
Mikhail, 2002). Despite this aversion to harm, widespread harm often occurs both within the 
United States as well as abroad. Thus, it is important to understand subtle variables that may lead 
even psychologically healthy people to make decisions that harm many people at once. Previous 
research has linked decisions to harm to mind perception. Building from this finding, I predicted 
that groups of people may be attributed less mind than an individual and that this may lead 
people to sometimes harm many more readily than one. Consistent with hypotheses, groups, and 
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especially entitative groups, were attributed less experience than individuals. Also consistent 
with hypotheses, sometimes people were more likely to harm many than one. Thus, although the 
behavior of a Wall Street CEO who causes financial devastation to many may seem psychopathic, 
the present findings provide preliminary evidence that the fact that he/she is harming multiple 
individuals may actually make that harm easier to enact.  Interestingly, however, greater harm of 
many than one was unrelated to reduced perceptions of experience for groups. Thus, future 
research is needed to illuminate the mechanisms behind a tendency to harm many more readily 
than one, even among psychologically healthy people. 
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APPENDIX: MATERIALS 
Wording for moral scenarios, Preliminary Study: 
Imagine that you must decide whether to launch a drone attack on Afghanistan and that 
this decision is extremely time urgent: 
Intelligence indicates that a leader of a local terrorist group is temporarily in a rural area outside 
of Kabul, Afghanistan. This influential leader is thought to be plotting an attack on America. 
 In the next few minutes you must decide whether to launch a drone that will kill this terrorist 
leader. This decision is time urgent (the terrorist is on the move) and you must decide now. The 
drone is in position and ready to launch. 
Individual Afghan Condition 
Intelligence also indicates that this drone attack will kill a single innocent Afghan civilian named 
Akhtar Muhammad. Travel documents indicate that this person is the only person staying in a 
local hostel and will be the only additional casualty to result from the drone strike. 
Imagine that you must decide whether to launch a drone attack on Afghanistan and that 
this decision is extremely time urgent. 
Individual American Condition 
Intelligence also indicates that this drone attack will kill a single innocent American civilian 
named Brad Miller. Travel documents indicate that this person is the only person staying in a 
local hostel and will be the only additional casualty to result from the drone strike. 
Imagine that you must decide whether to launch a drone attack on Afghanistan and that 
this decision is extremely time urgent: 
American Group Condition 
Intelligence also indicates that this drone attack will kill 11 innocent American civilians. Travel 
documents indicate that these 11 Americans are the only people staying in a local hostel and will 
be the only additional casualties to result from the drone strike. 
Imagine that you must decide whether to launch a drone attack on Afghanistan and that 
this decision is extremely time urgent: 
Afghan Group Condition 
Intelligence also indicates that this drone attack will kill 11 innocent Afghan civilians. Travel 
documents indicate that these 11 Afghans are the only people staying in a local hostel and will be 
the only additional casualties to result from the drone strike. 
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Imagine that you must decide whether to launch a drone attack on Afghanistan and that 
this decision is extremely time urgent. 
Targets rated on mind perception, Study 1: 
Dog 
 
 Charlie is a 3-year-old Springer spaniel and a beloved member of the Graham family. 
 A 3-year-old Springer spaniel is a beloved member of the Graham family. 
 A group of ten 3-year-old Springer spaniels--beloved members of the Graham family. 
 
Wild Animal 
 
 Toby is a two-year-old wild chimpanzee living at an outdoor laboratory in Uganda. 
 A two-year-old wild chimpanzee living at an outdoor laboratory in Uganda. 
 A group of ten two-year-old wild chimpanzees living at an outdoor laboratory in Uganda. 
 
Baby 
 
 Nicholas Gannon is a five-month-old baby. 
 A five-month-old baby 
 A group of ten babies about five-months old 
 
Young girl 
 
 Samantha is a five-year-old girl. 
 A five-year-old girl 
 A group of ten five-year-old girls 
 
Dead person 
 
 Delores Gleitman recently passed away at the age of 65. 
 A woman recently passed away at the age of 65. 
 A group of ten women recently passed away at the age of 65. 
 
Robot 
 
 Kismet is part of a new class of "sociable" robots that can engage people in natural 
 interaction. To do this, Kismet perceives a variety of natural social signals from sound 
 and sight and delivers his own signals back to the human partner through gaze direction, 
 facial expression, body posture and vocal babbles. 
 
 A robot is a part of a new class of "sociable" robots that can engage people in natural 
 interaction. To do this, the robot perceives a variety of natural social signals from sound 
 and sight and delivers his own signals back to the human partner through gaze direction, 
 facial expression, body posture and vocal babbles. 
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 A group of ten robots is part of a new class of "sociable" robots that can engage people in 
 natural interaction. To do this, the group of robots perceive a variety of natural social 
 signals from sound and sight and delivers their own signals back to human partners 
 through gaze direction, facial expression, body posture and vocal babbles. 
 
Vegetative State 
 
 Gerald Schiff has been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for the past six months. 
 Although he has severe brain damage--Gerald does not appear to communicate with 
 others or make purposeful movements--his basic bodily functions (such as breathing, 
 sleeping, and circulation) are preserved. 
 
 A man has been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for the past six months. Although 
 he has severe brain damage--he does not appear to communicate with others or make 
 purposeful movements--his basic bodily functions (such as breathing, sleeping, and 
 circulation) are preserved. 
 
 A group of ten men have been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for the past six 
 months. Although they have severe brain damage--they do not appear to communicate 
 with others or make purposeful movements--their basic bodily functions (such as 
 breathing, sleeping, and circulation) are preserved. 
 
Sports Team 
 
 Brad Miller is a baseball player for a local team called the Eagles. 
 A baseball player for a local team called the Eagles. 
 A local baseball team called the Eagles. 
 
Accounting Company 
 
 Todd Billingsly is an accountant who lives in New York. 
 An accountant who lives in New York 
 An accounting company in New York 
 
Advertising Agency 
 
 Sharon Harvey, 38, works at an advertising agency in Chicago. 
 An advertiser, 38, who works at an advertising agency in Chicago. 
 An advertising agency in Chicago. 
 
Google 
 
 Gary Wilson works for Google. 
 A man works for Google. 
 Google. 
 
Facebook 
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 Megan Brown works for Facebook. 
 A woman working for Facebook. 
 Facebook. 
 
Investors 
 
 Patrick Young works at an investment firm on Wall Street. 
 A man working at an investment firm on Wall Street. 
 An investment firm on Wall Street. 
 
Afghans 
 
 Ahktar Muhammad is a man from Afghanistan. 
 A man from Afghanistan. 
 A group of ten people from Afghanistan. 
 
Americans 
 
 Evan Baker is a man from America. 
 A man from America. 
 A group of ten people from America. 
 
Canadians 
 
 Thomas Williams is a man from Canada. 
 A man from Canada. 
 A group of ten people from Canada. 
 
Russians 
 
 Anatolie Vetrov is a man from Russia. 
 A man from Russia. 
 A group of ten people from Russia. 
 
Black Americans 
 
 Jamal Jefferson is a Black American living in Chicago. 
 A Black American living in Chicago. 
 A group of ten Black Americans living in Chicago. 
 
White Americans 
 
 Greg Taylor a White American living in Washington D.C. 
 A White American living in Washington D.C. 
 A group of ten White Americans living in Washington D.C. 
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You 
 
 Now, imagine viewing yourself in a mirror. 
 
 
Measures of agency and experience, Study 1 and Study 2: 
(Four items from each factor with highest loading factor scores were chosen from Gray et al. 
2007.) 
Experience 
 How capable of feeling physical or emotional pleasure do you think [target] is?  
 How capable of feeling physical or emotional pain do you think [target] is?  
 How capable of feeling hunger do you think [target] is? 
 How capable of feeling fear do you think [target] is? 
Agency 
 How capable of exercising self-control do you think [target] is?  
 How capable of acting morally do you think [target] is?  
 How capable of remembering do you think [target] is? 
 How capable of planning do you think [target] is? 
Measures of warmth and competence taken from Fiske et al., 2002, Study 2: 
Warmth 
 How sociable do you think [target] is? 
 How unfriendly do you think [target] is? 
 How caring do you think [target] is? 
 How insensitive do you think [target] is? 
Competence 
 How capable do you think [target] is? 
 How disorganized do you think [target] is? 
 How skilled do you think [target] is? 
 How lazy do you think [target] is? 
Group-focus condition, Study 2 
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In this study we will ask for your impressions of a small accounting company (composed of 15 
people) located in New York City (NYC). Then you will make a decision in a hypothetical 
scenario. 
 
This study will examine how people make decisions. However, first we would like your 
impressions of the accounting company in NYC (composed of 15 people) based only on the 
information you have right now. 
 
Imagine now that you also work for a company in NYC. Furthermore, your company works with 
the accounting company described previously. 
 
Recently it has come to your attention that the accounting company has made an error that would 
allow you to benefit financially. In particular the accounting company mistakenly disclosed some 
information that they intended to keep private. By using this information you can make a profit 
and it would be perfectly legal for you to do so. However, to the degree that you choose to 
financially benefit from this error, the accounting company will suffer damage to their reputation 
when the error (and its financial consequences) become publicly known. 
 
Listed below are the possible decisions that you could make. On the next page we will ask you to 
choose one of these options. 
 
1. Take advantage of the error and make a $15,000 profit for yourself and cause severe 
damage to the reputation of the accounting company. 
 
2. Take advantage of the error and make a $10,000 profit for yourself and cause moderate 
damage to the reputation of the accounting company. 
 
3. Take advantage of the error and make a $5,000 profit for yourself and cause mild 
damage to the reputation of the accounting company. 
 
4. Take no actions and thus make no profit nor cause any damage to the reputation of the 
accounting company. 
 
Group-composition focus condition, Study 2 
 
In this study we will ask for your impressions of 15 individuals who work for a small accounting 
company located in New York City (NYC). Then you will make a decision in a hypothetical 
scenario. 
 
This study will examine how people make decisions. However, first we would like your 
impressions of the 15 individuals who work for the accounting company in NYC based only on 
the information you have right now. 
 
Imagine now that you also work for a company in NYC. Furthermore, your company works with 
the accounting company described previously. 
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Recently it has come to your attention that the 15 individuals who work for the accounting 
company have made an error that would allow you to benefit financially. In particular the 15 
individuals working for the accounting company mistakenly disclosed some information that 
they intended to keep private. By using this information you can make a profit and it would be 
perfectly legal for you to do so. However, to the degree that you choose to financially benefit 
from this error, the 15 individuals who work for the accounting company will suffer damage to 
their reputation when the error (and its financial consequences) become publicly known. 
 
Listed below are the possible decisions that you could make. On the next page we will ask you to 
choose one of these options. 
 
1. Take advantage of the error and make a $15,000 profit for yourself and cause severe 
damage to the reputation of the 15 individuals working for the accounting company. 
 
2. Take advantage of the error and make a $10,000 profit for yourself and cause moderate 
damage to the reputation of the 15 individuals working for the accounting company. 
 
3. Take advantage of the error and make a $5,000 profit for yourself and cause mild 
damage to the reputation of the 15 individuals working for the accounting company. 
 
4. Take no actions and thus make no profit nor cause any damage to the reputation of the 
15 individuals working for the accounting company. 
 
Individual focus condition, Study 2 
 
In this study we will ask for your impressions of a man who works for a small accounting 
company (composed of 15 people) located in New York City (NYC). Then you will make a 
decision in a hypothetical scenario. 
 
This study will examine how people make decisions. However, first we would like your 
impressions of the man who works for the accounting company in NYC based only on the 
information you have right now. 
 
Imagine now that you also work for a company in NYC. Furthermore, your company works with 
the accounting company described previously. 
 
Recently it has come to your attention that the man who works for the accounting company has 
made an error that would allow you to benefit financially. In particular the man who works for 
the accounting company mistakenly disclosed some information that the accounting company 
intended to keep private. By using this information you can make a profit and it would be 
perfectly legal for you to do so. However, to the degree that you choose to financially benefit 
from this error, the man who works for the accounting company will suffer damage to his 
reputation when the error (and its financial consequences) become publicly known. 
 
Listed below are the possible decisions that you could make. On the next page we will ask you to 
choose one of these options. 
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1. Take advantage of the error and make a $15,000 profit for yourself and cause severe 
damage to the reputation of the man who works for the accounting company. 
 
2. Take advantage of the error and make a $10,000 profit for yourself and cause moderate 
damage to the reputation of the man who works for the accounting company. 
 
3. Take advantage of the error and make a $5,000 profit for yourself and cause mild 
damage to the reputation of the man who works for the accounting company. 
 
4. Take no actions and thus make no profit nor cause any damage to the reputation of the 
man who works for the accounting company. 
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Table 1 
Mind perception across non-company targets, Study 1  
  Type of 
Target 
 M 
(Experience) 
 95% CI 
(Experience) 
M 
(Agency) 
 95% CI 
(Agency)   
Dog 
     
 
Group 81.78 (77.01, 86.55) 36.25 (30.91, 41.60) 
 
Individual 
(U) 88.04 (83.58, 92.50) 38.95 (33.95, 43,95) 
 
Individual (I) 88.16 (83.44,92.89) 38.51 (33.21, 43.81) 
Wild Animal 
     
 
Group 84.79 (80.16, 89.41) 39.47 (33.58, 45.36) 
 
Individual 
(U) 88.41 (83.94, 92.87) 42.79 (37.10, 48.48) 
 
Individual (I) 86.41 (82.09, 90.73) 48.5 (43.00, 54.00) 
Baby 
     
 
Group 84.62 (79.57, 89.68) 15.59 (10.99, 20.20) 
 
Individual 
(U) 82.72 (77.54, 87.91) 17.35 (12.75, 21.95) 
 
Individual (I) 81.32 (76.13, 86.50) 14.99 (10.50, 19.48) 
Young Girl 
     
 
Group 89.13 (85.20, 93.07) 53.87 (48.94, 58.81) 
 
Individual 
(U) 89.45 (85.16, 93.74) 57.18 (51.80, 62.56) 
 
Individual (I) 87.40 (83.40, 91.40) 51.8 (46.78, 56.81) 
Dead Person 
     
 
Group 5.70 (.863, 10.54) 4.88 (.62, 9.15) 
 
Individual 
(U) 3.72 (-1.12, 8.55) 4.08 (-.18, 8.35) 
 
Individual (I) 7.38 (2.42, 12.35) 6.86 (2.49, 11.24) 
Robot 
     
 
Group 11.05 (5.36, 16.73) 54.30 (47.08, 61.52) 
 
Individual 
(U) 9.81 (3.87, 15.74) 53.04 (45.51, 60.57) 
 
Individual (I) 11.50 (5.77, 17.24) 54.27 (47.00, 61.55) 
Vegetative State 
     
 
Group 38.36 (30.70, 46.02) 14.10 (9.24, 18.96) 
 
Individual 
(U) 32.06 (24.33, 39.78) 12.64 (7.74, 17.54) 
 
Individual (I) 38.18 (30.58, 45.77) 16.45 (11.63, 21.27) 
Sports Team 
     
 
Group 80.34 (75.44, 85.23) 75.02 (69.92, 80.13) 
 
Individual 
(U) 87.60 (82.70, 92.50) 82.37 (77.26, 87.48) 
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Individual (I) 89.45 (84.60, 94.31) 84.48 (79.42, 89.54) 
Afghans 
     
 
Group 87.52 (82.81, 92.24) 81.00 (75.88, 86.12) 
 
Individual 
(U) 89.32 (84.69, 93.96) 80.24 (75.21, 85.27) 
 
Individual (I) 89.02 (84.58, 93.47) 81.51 (76.69, 86.34) 
Americans 
     
 
Group 87.55 (83.54, 91.56) 78.43 (74.13, 82.72) 
 
Individual 
(U) 92.43 (88.42, 96.44) 85.58 (81.28, 89.87) 
 
Individual (I) 85.49 (81.44, 89.53) 80.33 (74.13, 82.72) 
Canadians 
     
 
Group 85.63 (80.96, 90.30) 82.64 (78.29, 86.99) 
 
Individual 
(U) 89.46 (84.91, 94.01) 88.15 (83.91, 92.39) 
 
Individual (I) 89.89 (85.30, 94.48) 85.2 (80.92, 89.47) 
Russians 
     
 
Group 88.19 (83.79, 92.59) 80.89 (79.78, 88.08) 
 
Individual 
(U) 88.34 (83.71, 92.97) 84.59 (80.22, 88.96) 
 
Individual (I) 86.61 (82.06, 91.16) 83.93 (76.60, 85.18) 
Black Americans 
     
 
Group 89.92 (86.38, 93.45) 79.62 (74.94, 84.29) 
 
Individual 
(U) 92.98 (89.44, 96.52) 84.31 (79.63, 88.99) 
 
Individual (I) 87.09 (83.37, 90.81) 83.60 (78.67, 88.53) 
White Americans 
     
 
Group 84.61 (80.19, 89.04) 78.71 (74.25, 83.16) 
 
Individual 
(U) 87.46 (83.25, 91.68) 84.16 (79.92, 88.39) 
 
Individual (I) 89.49 (85.06, 93.91) 84.13 (79.67, 88.58) 
You 90.09     84.30   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  59 
Table 2 
Associations between prejudice and mind perception, Study 1 
     M   SD  r  r  
    (Prejudice) (Prejudice) (with Experience) (with Agency) 
Target of Prejudice 
    
 
Black Americans 28.08 21.12       -0.23***    -0.38*** 
 
White Americans 26.88 21.34   -.21**   -.26*** 
 
Canadians 24.26 18.79 -.19* -.20** 
  Afghans 40.88 24.21      -.30***    -.45*** 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Mind perception controlling for stereotypes of warmth and competence, Study 2 
  
Type of Target 
 M 
(Experience) 
 95% CI 
(Experience) 
M 
(Agency) 
 95% CI 
(Agency)   
Condition 
     
 
Company (comprised of 
15 people) 2.65a (1.78, 3.52) 5.23a (4.66, 5.80) 
 
15 people (who compose a 
company) 7.62b (6.74, 8.50) 6.45b (5.87, 7.03) 
  
Man (who works for the 
company) 6.48c (5.63, 7.33) 6.39b (5.82, 6.95) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within the same column are significantly different from 
one another at p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Endorsement of collateral damage based on number and group membership of victims. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error from the mean, Preliminary Study, Partial Sample. 
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Figure 2. Endorsement of collateral damage based on number and group membership of victims. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error from the mean, Preliminary Study, Full Sample. 
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Figure 3. 95% Confidence intervals of experience and agency ratings across all groups, 
unidentified individuals, and identified individuals, Study 1. 
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Figure 4. Mind perception of companies and individuals (I = Identified; U = Unidentified) from 
those companies, Study 1. 
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Figure 5. 95% confidence intervals of experience and agency ratings for an accounting company 
(comprised of 15 people), 15 people (who compose the accounting company), and a man who 
works for the accounting company, Study 2. 
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Figure 6. Decisions to harm based on condition. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error from 
the mean, Study 2. 
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